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This paper studies optimal monetary policy responses in an economy featur-
ing sectorial heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustments. It shows that a
central bank facing heterogeneous nominal rigidities is more likely to behave less
aggressively than in a fully sticky economy. Hence, the supposedly excessive cau-
tion in the conduct of monetary policy shown by central banks could be partly
explained by the existence of a relevant sectorial dispersion in the frequency of
price adjustments.
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1Non technical summary 
Sectorial heterogeneity in price setting is a well established fact. Among others, Bils and 
Klenow (2004) and Dhyne et al. (2004) investigate the issue of the frequency of price adjustments 
for CPI data in several sectors of the United States and the euro area. While, on average, about 15% 
of prices in the euro area and 25% in the United States are adjusted each month, dispersion across 
sectors is most relevant. In the euro area and the United States, energy and unprocessed food prices 
display the highest frequency of price adjustment, while service prices are the stickiest. 
Another fairly well established fact is the puzzling “caution” that central banks, and the 
Federal Reserve in particular, seem to adopt in the conduct of monetary policy. Rudebusch and 
Sevnsson (1999), for example, estimate a small-scale model of the United States economy and, 
assuming a commonly accepted loss function for the central bank, show that the optimal Taylor rule 
in their setting has much larger coefficients on inflation and the output gap than the actual 
(estimated) Taylor rule of the Federal Reserve. Sack (2000) provides more evidence by performing 
a similar exercise and showing that the response of the federal funds rate to five identified economic 
shocks should be stronger than what is actually observed. 
This paper argues that the two stylized facts above may be linked. In fact, both the 
economic literature and the practice of policy-making assign a relevant role to core inflation 
indices. These indices filter out high frequency fluctuations from prices in order to improve the 
understanding of medium-term inflationary pressures on the economy (for a survey of methods see 
Cristadoro et al., 2005). In particular, simple core inflation indices are derived by eliminating the 
most volatile components (usually, unprocessed food and energy prices) from the aggregate price 
index. How does this practice of central banks affect their behavior? In particular, do central banks 
behave more or less aggressively by using core inflation rather than overall inflation as a measure to 
assess inflationary pressures? 
Aoki (2001) studies an economy featuring a continuum of sticky price goods and one 
flexible price good and shows that, in this economy, an optimizing central bank should fully 
stabilize inflation in the sticky price sector rather than overall inflation. Sticky price inflation, 
responding to smoothed expectations of output gaps and relative price changes, is defined as core 
inflation to the extent that it captures a persistent component of inflation. Both the form of nominal 
rigidities in Aoki (2001) and the definition of core inflation are maintained in this paper. 
However, in contrast to Aoki (2001), this paper assumes the existence of nonnegligible 
transaction frictions. This creates a trade-off between macroeconomic stabilization (that is, 
stabilization of inflation and the output gap) and interest rate stabilization, a feature that is rather 
plausible empirically. As a result of this assumption, full stabilization of core inflation is no longer 
the only desired target of the optimizing central bank. Then, the equilibrium solution for inflation, 
aggregate activity and the interest rate conditional to the policy rule followed by the central bank 
are derived, based on two assumptions. 
First, it is assumed that the central bank can only implement an optimal noninertial plan as 
in Woodford (1999): the policy instrument is assumed to be a linear function of only present and 
future values of policy relevant variables. Conditional to the optimal non-inertial plan, the dynamics 
of the economy can be derived analytically in order to identify the drivers of the aggressiveness in 
the reaction of the interest rate to shocks. Comparing the outcomes in the economy with 
heterogeneous price setters (heterogeneous economy) with those in an economy with 100% of 
sticky price goods (hereafter, baseline New Keynesian economy, described in Woodford, 1999), it 
turns out that the optimal non-inertial plan in the heterogeneous economy may generate less 
aggressive responses of the interest rate to supply and demand shocks than in the baseline New 
Keynesian (NK) economy. A sufficient condition for the latter is that output is rather interest sensitive, that is the transmission of the monetary impulse to output is rather strong. In fact, the 
presence of sectorial heterogeneity in nominal rigidities makes aggregate activity less interest-
sensitive than in the baseline fully sticky price economy. This effect is more pronounced the 
stronger the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to output. Moreover, inflation sensitivity 
to output is “small” when output is strongly interest-sensitive. These two features reduce the 
willingness of monetary policy-makers to engage in macroeconomic stabilization increasing their 
willingness to preserve interest rate stability. However, if the sufficient condition above is not 
satisfied, other structural features of the economy shape the aggressiveness of monetary policy. 
Finally, the assumption of forward-looking policy is relaxed and it is shown that the 
unconstrained optimal and time consistent policy rule of the central bank features history-
dependence. Conditional to this policy, the equilibrium path for inflation, output gap and the 
interest rate can no longer be analytically derived. Numerical outcomes show that, conditional to the 
fully optimal policy and to a wide range of parameters, the reaction of the interest rate to supply and 
demand shocks is less aggressive in the heterogeneous economy compared with the fully sticky 
economy. 
Hence, a central bank in an economy featuring heterogeneity in the mechanisms of price 
adjustments is more likely to behave less aggressively than in a fully sticky economy.  
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Sektorale Heterogenität bei der Preissetzung ist eine gut belegte Tatsache. So sind etwa 
Bils und Klenow (2004) und Dhyne et al. (2004) der Frage nach der Häufigkeit von 
Preisanpassungen für VPI-Daten in verschiedenen Sektoren der Vereinigten Staaten und des 
Euro-Währungsgebiets nachgegangen. Jeden Monat werden durchschnittlich rund 15  % der 
Preise im Eurogebiet und 25  % der Preise in den Vereinigten Staaten angepasst. Am 
aussagekräftigsten dabei sind jedoch die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Sektoren. So 
werden die Preise für Energie und unverarbeitete Nahrungsmittel im Eurogebiet und den 
Vereinigten Staaten am häufigsten angepasst, während sich die Preise für Dienstleistungen als 
am rigidesten erweisen.  
Eine andere recht bekannte Tatsache ist die erstaunliche „Vorsicht“, die Zentralbanken, 
und insbesondere die Federal Reserve, bei der Durchführung der Geldpolitik augenscheinlich an 
den Tag legen. So schätzen Rudebusch und Svensson (1999) beispielsweise ein kleines Modell 
der US-Wirtschaft und zeigen unter Annahme einer allgemein akzeptierten Verlustfunktion für 
die Zentralbank auf, dass die optimale Taylor-Regel in ihrem Szenario viel größere 
Koeffizienten der Inflation und der Produktionslücke als die eigentliche (geschätzte) Taylor-
Regel der Federal Reserve hat. Sack (2000) liefert in einer ähnlichen Analyse weitere Belege 
dafür, dass die Reaktion der federal funds rate auf fünf identifizierte konjunkturelle Schocks 
stärker als tatsächlich beobachtet ausfallen sollte.  
Im vorliegenden Papier wird argumentiert, dass zwischen den beiden oben genannten 
stilisierten Fakten ein Zusammenhang bestehen könnte. In der Tat weist sowohl die 
wissenschaftliche Literatur als auch die reale Geldpolitik den Indikatoren für die Kerninflation 
eine wichtige Rolle zu. Diese Indikatoren filtern Hochfrequenzschwankungen aus den Preisen 
heraus, um zu einem besseren Verständnis des mittelfristigen Preisdrucks auf die Wirtschaft zu 
gelangen (ein Überblick über die Methoden findet sich in Cristadoro et al., 2005). So werden 
einfache Kerninflationsraten ermittelt, indem man die volatilsten Komponenten (normalerweise 
sind dies die Preise für unverarbeitete Nahrungsmittel und Energie) aus dem Gesamtpreisindex 
ausschließt. Inwieweit wirkt sich diese Praxis der Zentralbanken auf ihr eigenes Verhalten aus? 
Verhalten sie sich durch Zugrundelegung der Kerninflation aggressiver oder weniger aggressiv, 
als wenn sie die Gesamtinflation als Messgröße zur Beurteilung des Inflationsdrucks 
verwenden? 
Aoki (2001) untersucht eine Volkswirtschaft, die durch ein Kontinuum rigider 
Güterpreise („sticky prices“) und einem Gut mit flexiblen Preisen gekennzeichnet ist, und zeigt, 
dass eine optimierende Zentralbank in dieser Volkswirtschaft die Entwicklung im Sektor der 
rigiden Preise vollkommen stabilisieren sollte statt die Gesamtinflation. Eine träge Anpassung 
des Güterpreisniveaus („Sticky-price-Inflation“) - als Reaktion auf geglättete Erwartungen in 
Bezug auf die Produktionslücken und relativen Preisänderungen - wird insoweit als 
Kerninflation definiert, als dass sie eine dauerhafte, rigide Komponente der Inflation 
widerspiegelt. Sowohl die Form der nominalen Rigiditäten gemäß Aoki (2001) als auch die 
Definition der Kerninflation werden in diesem Papier beibehalten.  
Anders als Aoki (2001) unterstellt dieses Papier jedoch die Existenz von nicht zu 
vernachlässigenden Transaktionsfriktionen. Dies schafft einen Zielkonflikt zwischen 
makroökonomischer Stabilisierung (d.  h. Stabilisierung von Inflation und Produktionslücke) 
und Zinsstabilisierung - was empirisch recht plausibel ist. Aufgrund dieser Annahme stellt die 
vollkommene Stabilisierung der Kerninflation nicht mehr das einzige angestrebte Ziel der 
optimierenden Zentralbank dar. Dann werden die Gleichgewichtslösungen für die Inflation, die 
gesamtwirtschaftliche Aktivität und den Zinssatz nach der von der Zentralbank angewandten 
geldpolitischen Regel auf Basis von zwei Annahmen abgeleitet.  
Zunächst wird angenommen, dass die Zentralbank lediglich einen Optimal Noninertial 
Plan wie in Woodford (1999) umsetzen kann: Das geldpolitische Instrument ist den Annahmen 
zufolge ausschließlich eine lineare Funktion der gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Werte der  
geldpolitisch relevanten Variablen. Im Rahmen des Optimal Noninertial Plan lässt sich die 
Wirtschaftsdynamik analytisch ableiten, um die Bestimmungsfaktoren der Aggressivität der 
Zinsreaktion auf Schocks zu ermitteln. Vergleicht man die Resultate in der von heterogener 
Preissetzung geprägten Wirtschaft (heterogene Wirtschaft) mit den Resultaten in einer 
Wirtschaft mit hundertprozentiger Preisrigidität (nachfolgend bezeichnet als Baseline New 
Keynesian Economy, wie in Woodford 1999 beschrieben), so stellt sich heraus, dass der 
Optimal Noninertial Plan in der heterogenen Wirtschaft weniger aggressive Reaktionen des 
Zinssatzes auf Angebots- und Nachfrageschocks zur Folge hat als in der Baseline New 
Keynesian (NK) Economy. Als hinreichende Vorraussetzung für Letzteres gilt, dass die 
Produktionsleistung recht zinsempfindlich ist, d. h., die Transmission des monetären Impulses 
auf die Produktion ist ziemlich stark. In der Tat bewirkt eine sektorale Heterogenität bei 
nominalen Rigiditäten, dass die gesamtwirtschaftliche Aktivität weniger zinssensitiv reagiert als 
es in der Baseline Economy mit vollkommen rigiden Preisen der Fall wäre. Je stärker der 
Transmissionsmechanismus der Geldpolitik auf die Produktion, umso ausgeprägter ist dieser 
Effekt. Darüber hinaus ist die Reagibilität der Inflation auf die Produktion „gering“, wenn die 
Produktion sehr zinssensitiv ist. Diese zwei Besonderheiten reduzieren die Bereitschaft der 
Geldpolitik, sich eingehend mit makroökonomischer Stabilisierung zu beschäftigen, und 
erhöhen ihre Bereitschaft, Zinsstabilität zu wahren. Ist jedoch die oben erwähnte hinreichende 
Voraussetzung nicht erfüllt, so sind es andere strukturelle Merkmale der Wirtschaft, die die 
Aggressivität der Geldpolitik bestimmen.  
Schließlich wird die Annahme der vorausschauenden Geldpolitik abgeschwächt und 
gezeigt, dass die uneingeschränkte, optimale und zeitkonsistente geldpolitische Regel der 
Zentralbank vergangenheitsbezogen ist. Dadurch bedingt kann der Gleichgewichtspfad für 
Inflation, Produktionslücke und Zinssatz nicht mehr analytisch abgeleitet werden. Numerische 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass bei einer vollkommen optimalen Geldpolitik und einer breiten Palette 
an Parametern die Reaktion des Zinssatzes auf Angebots- und Nachfrageschocks in der 
heterogenen Wirtschaft nicht so aggressiv ausfällt wie in einer vollkommen rigiden Wirtschaft.   
Folglich verhält sich eine Zentralbank in einer Wirtschaft, deren 
Preisanpassungsmechanismen sich durch Heterogenität auszeichnen, aller Wahrscheinlichkeit 
nach weniger aggressiv als in einer vollkommen rigiden Wirtschaft. 
 1 Introduction
Sectorial heterogeneity in price setting is a well established fact. Among others, Bils
and Klenow (2004) and Dhyne et al. (2004) investigate the issue of the frequency of
price adjustments for CPI data in several sectors of the United States and the euro
area. While, on average, about 15% of prices in the euro area and 25% in the United
States are adjusted each month, dispersion across sectors is most relevant. In the euro
area and the United States, energy and unprocessed food prices display the highest
frequency of price adjustment, while service prices are the stickiest.
Another fairly well established fact is the puzzling “caution” that central banks, and
the Federal Reserve in particular, seem to adopt in the conduct of monetary policy.
Rudebusch and Svennsson (1999), for example, estimate a small-scale model of the
United States economy and, assuming a commonly accepted loss function for the central
bank, show that the optimal Taylor rule in their setting has much larger coeﬃcients
on inﬂation and the output gap than the actual (estimated) Taylor rule of the Federal
Reserve. Sack (2000) provides more evidence by performing a similar exercise and
showing that the response of the federal funds rate to ﬁve identiﬁed economic shocks
should be stronger than what is actually observed.
This paper argues that the two stylized facts above may be linked. In fact, both
the economic literature and the practice of policy-making assign a relevant role to core
inﬂation indices. These indices ﬁlter out high frequency ﬂuctuations from prices in order
to improve the understanding of medium-term inﬂationary pressures on the economy
(for a survey of methods see Cristadoro et al., 2005). In particular, simple core inﬂation
indices are derived by eliminating the most volatile components (usually, unprocessed
food and energy prices) from the aggregate price index. How does this practice of
central banks aﬀect their behavior? In particular, do central banks behave more or less
aggressively by using core inﬂation rather than overall inﬂation as a measure to assess
inﬂationary pressures?
Aoki (2001) studies an economy featuring a continuum of sticky price goods and
one ﬂexible price good and shows that, in this economy, an optimizing central bank
should fully stabilize inﬂation in the sticky price sector rather than overall inﬂation.
Sticky price inﬂation, responding to smoothed expectations of output gaps and relative
price changes, is deﬁned as core inﬂation to the extent that it captures a persistent
component of inﬂation. Both the form of nominal rigidities in Aoki (2001) and the
deﬁnition of core inﬂation are maintained in this paper.
However, in contrast to Aoki (2001), this paper assumes the existence of non-
negligible transaction frictions. This creates a trade-oﬀ between macroeconomic stabi-
lization (that is, stabilization of inﬂation and the output gap) and interest rate stabi-
lization, a feature that is rather plausible empirically. As a result of this assumption,
full stabilization of core inﬂation is no longer the only desired target of the optimizing
central bank. Then, the equilibrium solution for inﬂation, aggregate activity and the
interest rate conditional to the policy rule followed by the central bank are derived,
based on two assumptions.
First, it is assumed that the central bank can only implement an optimal non-
inertial plan as in Woodford (1999): the policy instrument is assumed to be a linear
1function of only present and future values of policy relevant variables. Conditional to
the optimal non-inertial plan, the dynamics of the economy can be derived analytically
in order to identify the drivers of the aggressiveness in the reaction of the interest rate
to shocks. Comparing the outcomes in the economy with heterogeneous price setters
(heterogeneous economy) with those in an economy with 100% of sticky price goods
(hereafter, baseline New Keynesian economy, described in Woodford, 1999), it turns
out that the optimal non-inertial plan in the heterogeneous economy may generate
less aggressive responses of the interest rate to supply and demand shocks than in the
baseline New Keynesian (NK) economy. A suﬃcient condition for the latter is that
output is rather interest sensitive, that is the transmission of the monetary impulse
to output is rather strong. In fact, the presence of sectorial heterogeneity in nominal
rigidities makes aggregate activity less interest-sensitive than in the baseline fully sticky
price economy. This eﬀect is more pronounced the stronger the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy to output. Moreover, inﬂation sensitivity to output is “small”
when output is strongly interest-sensitive. These two features reduce the willingness
of monetary policy-makers to engage in macroeconomic stabilization increasing their
willingness to preserve interest rate stability. However, if the suﬃcient condition above
is not satisﬁed, other structural features of the economy shape the aggressiveness of
monetary policy.
Finally, the assumption of forward-looking policy is relaxed and it is shown that
the unconstrained optimal and time consistent policy rule of the central bank features
history-dependence. Conditional to this policy, the equilibrium path for inﬂation, out-
put gap and the interest rate can no longer be analytically derived. Numerical outcomes
show that, conditional to the fully optimal policy and to a wide range of parameters,
the reaction of the interest rate to supply and demand shocks is less aggressive in the
heterogeneous economy compared with the fully sticky economy.
Hence, a central bank in an economy featuring heterogeneity in the mechanisms
of price adjustments is more likely to behave less aggressively than in a fully sticky
economy.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents the model economy and
its loglinear approximation; section 3 describes the optimal monetary policy problem;
section 4 solves the optimal monetary problems and provides an interpretation for the
results; section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Heterogeneity in the degree of nominal rigidities across sectors is a relevant empirical
feature in the United States and the euro area. Consequently, a model that describes the
optimal behavior of the monetary policy-maker should take this feature into account.
To this end, this paper follows Aoki (2001) by adopting a framework in which there is
a good that has a ﬂexible price2 and a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods whose price
2Benigno (2003) and Woodford (2003) specify two sectors (or countries) models with diﬀerent degrees
of price stickiness and imperfect competition. However, the simpliﬁed framework of Aoki (2001) is
adopted here in order to account for the extremely skewed distribution of frequency of adjustment in
2is sticky3.
The economy is populated by a continuum (0 − 1) of inﬁnitely lived households.
Each household can work at the production of only one single good. A fraction of size
γ of these households supply their labor for the production of a continuum 0 − γ of
diﬀerentiated sticky price goods. The remaining households (of measure 1 − γ) supply
their services for the production of a ﬂexible price good. Households receive utility















where β is the constant subjective discount factor, Ci
t total consumption expenditure of
household i, Mi
t nominal balances, Pt the aggregate price index and hi
j,t hours worked
into the production of the good i (i =0− γ;f) in sector j (j = s,f). Bt, Dt and Ej,t
are preference shocks with Bt and Dt common to all the agents while Ej,t is allowed to
vary across the two sectors. The utility function is concave and additive separable in
its arguments and there is a positive level of real balances at which agents are satiated.
Ci








γγ(1 − γ)1−γ (2.2)
where Ci
st and Ci
ft are, respectively, aggregate household i consumption expenditure in
sticky price and ﬂexible price goods. Ci



















where ϑ represents the constant degree of substitutability across goods and it is assumed
















t+1 represents the amount of ﬁnancial wealth carried over to the next period
by household i, wi
j,t is the wage earned by household i for the production of good i in
sector j,Π t(z) is the amount of proﬁts stemming from the sale of good z accruing to
household i, it is the risk-free interest rate, im
t is the interest rate earned on nominal
goods and services prices.
3Here, ﬂexible and sticky sectors are deﬁned as the set of ﬁrms producing the ﬂexible price goods
and the sticky price goods, respectively
3balances4 and Qt,t+1 is the unique stochastic discount factor or asset-pricing kernel in










where Pft is the price of the unique ﬂexible price good, while Pst is the index that













Household i chooses its optimal contingent plan for consumption expenditure, ﬁnancial
wealth, hours worked and real balances taking good prices, ﬁnancial prices and wages











which links the expected evolution of the consumption path to the expected real interest
rate. Higher expected real interest rates induce households to save more and then to a
steeper positively sloped or a ﬂatter negatively sloped consumption path. Notice that
consumption expenditure is not indexed in (2.8) since, in equilibrium, consumers share
risk perfectly. Money demand is the same for all agents: it is positively aﬀected by the
level of transactions and negatively aﬀected by the opportunity cost of holding wealth







Overall consumption expenditure is split across sticky and ﬂexible price goods according










that is, aggregate consumption of the goods in the two sectors depends negatively on the
relative prices of the sectorial consumption aggregates with respect to the aggregate
4Here, i
m
t = 0 which turns out to represent the institutional arrangements of actual central banks,
like the Federal Reserve.
4consumption price index. The overall expenditure devoted to sticky price goods is




























that is, they equal the marginal rate of substitution between hours worked and con-
sumption to the real wage they earn. Firms set prices optimally by taking the demand




that, on aggregate, imply
Yst = Cst,Y ft = Cft,Y t = Ct
Moreover, the production function of each of the ﬁrms takes the simple linear form
yj,t(i)=Aj,thj,t(i) (2.15)
where there is only a production input, labor, whose marginal productivity is aﬀected by
a stochastically evolving and possibly sector-speciﬁc technological factor. Consequently,














Since ﬁrms in the ﬂexible price sector act in a regime of perfect competition, their











The sticky price sector, on the other hand, features both real and nominal rigidities.
Goods are diﬀerentiated and ﬁrms act in a regime of monopolistic competition. More-
over, in each period, only a fraction 1−ξ of randomly chosen ﬁrms can optimally reset
their price at the value P∗
st(i)5. ξ can be alternatively interpreted as the probability
for each ﬁrm in the sticky price sector not to be drawn among the price setters at each
period. Equation (2.7) then implies
P1−ϑ
st = ξP1−ϑ
st−1 +( 1− ξ)P∗
st(i)1−ϑ (2.17)
As for P∗
st(i), every ﬁrm entitled to reset its price at time t realizes that with a constant
probability at each time and independently of when it last changed its price, it will not
be able to reset its price. Moreover, such a ﬁrm takes into account a demand curve
for its good of the form (2.12). Finally, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the
production in the sticky price sector is subsidized at a rate τ such that the eﬀects of
markup pricing in monopolistic competition are completely oﬀset. Consequently, ﬁrm














































implying that producers in the sticky sector optimally reset their price at a present
discounted value of their current and expected future marginal costs. Assuming that
τ = 1
















yt+T(i) = 0 (2.19)
5This form of nominal rigidities is proposed by Calvo (1983).
6Et denotes conditional expectation based on the information set available at time t.
6In order to solve the model, the ﬁrst order conditions are loglinearized around a
deterministic steady state with zero inﬂation. The loglinear version of the model is












Moreover, the sectorial inﬂation rates are deﬁned as




and the overall inﬂation rate as
πt =l o g
Pt
Pt−1
Hereafter, small cases indicate logarithmic deviations from steady state. By manipu-
lating and loglinearizing equation (2.6), one obtains










As for aggregate demand, loglinearization of the Euler equation (8) provides
yt − bt = Et(yt+1 − bt+1) −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) (2.23)
which is usually deﬁned as the New IS equation8. As its non-linear counterpart, this
equation states that the expected slope of the temporal path of aggregate demand de-
pends on the expected real interest rate it − Etπt+1. However, the sensitivity of the
path to the riskless interest rate (and consequently to monetary policy) is aﬀected by
the (steady state) value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1
σ = − UC
UCCC.T h e
more agents are willing to substitute intertemporally (that is, the bigger the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution), the more aggregate demand is sensitive to the interest
rate and hence to monetary policy. The equations (2.11) and (2.12), relating to the in-
dividual demand for goods, can be aggregated and loglinearized providing the sectorial
demand curves
yst = yt − xst (2.24)
7The symbol Δ indicates ﬁrst diﬀerencing
8Throughout this paper, all the stochastic processes of the shocks are assumed to be stationary and
normalized to 1 in steady state. Consequently, bt = −
UCB
UCCCBt.
7yft = yt − xft (2.25)
which are downward sloping in the corresponding prices relative to the overall index.
Importantly, sectorial outputs may be aﬀected by the other sector dynamics through
their dependence on aggregate output and the linkages in relative prices xft and xst,
highlighted in equation (2.21). The ﬁrst order condition for real balances (2.9) gives
mt = ηyyt − ηiit + εt (2.26)
where ηy and ηi are two positive coeﬃcients, while εt is a composite shock that involves
both Bt and Dt
9. This equation is a stochastic version of the traditional LM equation
where money demand depends positively on the level of transactions and negatively
on the opportunity cost of holding wealth in a monetary form. Natural (or potential)
output10 can be derived by setting prices equal to current marginal cost in both sectors.












ejt with j=s,f (2.27)
where ω = Vhh
Vh h (and is assumed equal in both sectors) and η = Vhe
Vh .I t i s w o r t h
noticing that, if the labor supply shock and the technology shock are common to the
whole economy, natural output in the sticky price sector and in the ﬂexible price sector
are the same. Aggregate output gap gt is deﬁned as







which, in the case of common technology and labor supply shocks, simpliﬁes to11
gt = yt − yn
st = yt − yn
ft
Core inﬂation depends only on the prices of the ﬁrms in the sticky price sector that







st, the index i is dropped since each ﬁrm sets it at the same value, in
equilibrium. The optimal pricing equation in the sticky price sector (2.19) may be
loglinearized along the lines of Aoki (2001) and Woodford (2003) to derive a stochastic
diﬀerence equation in p∗
st. Putting this equation together with equation (2.29) and
manipulating slightly, one ﬁnds
9In particular, ηy =
σ
σm where σ has previously been deﬁned and σ
m = −
KMM














10Deﬁned as output in the fully ﬂexible price economy.
11In other words, when all the shocks in the economy are aggregate, aggregate output gap is equal
to the sectorial output gaps gst = yt − y
n
st and gft = yt − y
n
ft
8πst = βEtπst+1 +
(ω + σ)(1 − ξβ)(1 − ξ)
ξ(1 + ϑω)γ
gt (2.30)
Core inﬂation is forward-looking because ﬁrms forecast the future evolution of their
marginal costs when they are allowed to reset the price, as they might not be able to
adjust it in the future. For the sake of simplicity, the elasticity of inﬂation to current
output gap is deﬁned as
k =
(ω + σ)(1 − ξβ)(1 − ξ)
ξ(1 + ϑω)γ
(2.31)
Finally, it is worth noting that by substituting the deﬁnition of aggregate output gap
(2.28) in equation (2.23), one obtains
gt = Et(gt+1) −
1
σ













is the so called “natural interest rate”: the real interest rate in a fully ﬂexible price
economy.
3 The policy problem
This section describes the objectives of monetary policy and the constraints that the
structure of the economy imposes on the central bank in setting the desired contingent
path for the welfare relevant variables.
The quadratic loss function12 of the central bank may be derived by means of a

















12For a derivation, see appendix 1.
13In deriving the approximation, the transaction frictions described in the previous section are as-
sumed to be “small” in the sense of Woodford (2003). Moreover, it is also assumed that the government
subsidizes production in the sticky price sector in order to eliminate the eﬀects of monopolistic pricing,
as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). On the consequences of diﬀerent assumptions (small or delib-
erately large monopolistic distortions and distortionary taxation), see Woodford (2003) and Benigno
and Woodford (2004).
9λg =
(ω + σ)(1 − ξ)(1 − ξβ)
ξγ2ϑ(1 + ωϑ)
(3.36)
represent, respectively, the weights of interest rate and output gap stabilization relative
to core inﬂation stabilization14 and i∗ =l n 1
1+iss with iss equal to the steady state value
of the nominal interest rate. As in Aoki (2001), the central bank in this economy must
stabilize core inﬂation (πst) and aggregate output gap (gt). Output gap appears in
the loss function because the level of aggregate output in the economy is ineﬃcient,
due to nominal rigidities rather than imperfect competition, whose eﬀect on output is
eliminated by a government subsidy. However, eliminating the output gap is not enough
to lead the economy to an eﬃcient allocation of resources. In fact, price staggering
implies an ineﬃcient dispersion of prices. Such a distortion is eliminated by setting
inﬂation to zero, which explains why inﬂation in the sticky price sector (core inﬂation)
appears as an argument in the loss function. The relative price of the ﬂexible good
with respect to the aggregate is set at a sub-optimal level from a social welfare point
of view only because of the linkages between the two sectors highlighted in (2.21).
Consequently, eliminating distortions in the sticky price sector is enough to restore the
eﬃcient allocation in the ﬂexible price sector and in the aggregate, as well. This is why
no variables relative to the ﬂexible price sector appear explicitly in the loss function.
Output gap and core inﬂation stabilization will be jointly referred to as “macroeconomic
stabilization” from now on.
On the other hand, the central bank in this model should also dampen ﬂuctuations
in its operating target, the risk-free interest rate, diﬀerently from Aoki (2001). In
fact, money provides services to the agents and is included in their utility functions.
Consequently, the central bank should give the agents as much money as needed to
satiate them, driving the nominal interest rate to the return earned by money15. Hence,
every variation of the interest rate from the return to money16 is penalized in the loss
function of the central bank. Hereafter, this objective will be deﬁned as “operating
target stabilization”.
Operating target stabilization generally runs counter to macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. In fact, in (2.32), macroeconomic stabilization implies that the real interest rate
equals the natural interest rate rn
t , while operating target stabilization requires the
nominal interest rate to be constantly equal to zero. The consequences of this trade-oﬀ
will be explored at length in the next section.
The structure of the economy acts as a constraint in the problem of the central
bank. Usually, one must consider the equations deﬁning the dynamics of aggregate
activity (2.32) and inﬂation in the sticky price goods (2.30). On the other hand, notice
that, from equation (2.22)




14The weights depend on the deep parameters coming from the microfoundations of the model. The
only parameter that has not been deﬁned before is v, which represents steady state “money velocity”.
15This fact is commonly deﬁned as the Friedman Rule.
16A s s u m e dt ob ez e r oi nt h i sp a p e r .
10implying that in order to solve for inﬂation and aggregate activity, the evolution of the
relative price in the ﬂexible price sector is to be taken into account. To this end, by
loglinearizing (2.16) we get






By replacing aggregate inﬂation in (2.32) with (2.22), the system of equations de-
ﬁned by (2.30) and (2.32) includes the three variables πst, gt and xft,a sw e l la st h e
monetary policy instrument it.F u r t h e r m o r e ,( 3 .37) provides an expression for xft that
depends only on the sectorial output gap in the ﬂexible price sector. Assuming that
all the shocks in the economy are common, sectorial output gaps become equal to
aggregate output gap. This implies
xft = cgt (3.38)
that can be used to eliminate xft giving
gt = Et(gt+1) −
1
S
(it − Etπst+1 − rn
t ) (3.39)
where




In other words, the central bank is only subject to the two constraints (2.30) and
(3.39) in its minimization problem. Notice that this problem is isomorphic to the one
in Giannoni (2002) and Woodford (1999) “baseline New Keynesian model”. However,
inﬂation is replaced by core inﬂation and the parameters are diﬀerent17. As the size of
the sticky price sector (γ) approaches 1, core inﬂation approaches overall inﬂation and
the problem here converges to the one in the baseline New Keynesian model. Then,
the outocmes for the heterogeneous (γ<1) economy of this paper are easily compared
to those of the baseline model retrieved by setting γ =1 .
Assuming, instead, that the technological and/or labor supply shocks are sector
speciﬁc, xft depends on the relative sectorial output gap rather than the aggregate
output gap. At any rate, a structural constraint in the same form as (3.39) can be





17Giannoni (2002) and Woodford (1999) specify the same loss function as in this paper but with
arbitrary weights on the diﬀerent objectives. Instead, here the weights come from the microfoundations
of the model. This makes it possible to measure the impact of a diﬀerent γ (smaller than 1 as in the
current model, rather than equal to 1 as in the baseline New Keynesian) on the relative importance of
the macroeconomic and operating target stabilization.
11as the natural relative ﬂexible price18,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
gt = Et(gt+1) −
1
S
(it − Etπst+1 − ut) (3.42)
where, again






t − EtΔxft+1 (3.43)
Hence, assuming sectorial technology and labor supply shocks, the optimal problem of
the central bank remains virtually the same. The only diﬀerence in (3.42) with respect
to (3.39) is in the interpretation of the composite shock. For this reason, this paper
only deals with the case of common shocks.
Summing up, in the economy outlined in the previous section, the central bank aims
to minimize a loss function that embeds quadratic terms in core inﬂation, aggregate
output gap and the interest rate. Both in the case of common and sectorial technology
and labor supply shocks, the central bank is subject to two structural constraints (2.30
and 3.39 or 3.42) on the evolution of aggregate output and sticky price inﬂation. What
changes on the basis of the assumption on the shocks, is the stochastic process (and
interpretation) of the composite shocks appearing in the equations that deﬁne the
evolution of aggregate activity (3.39 and 3.42). Finally, the results obtained in this
paper are easily compared to those in the baseline model solved by Woodford (1999)
and Giannoni (2002) retrieved by setting γ = 1 in the results for the model with
heterogeneity.
4 Optimal monetary policy
This section derives the optimal monetary policy followed by the central bank in het-
erogeneous and baseline economies and studies the consequences (in terms of reaction
of the interest rate to shocks) of their implementation.
In particular, in the ﬁrst sub-section the central bank is assumed to follow the
optimal policy from a timeless perspective in the class of the forward-looking policies
(optimal non-inertial plan). While this policy is sub-optimal because of the constraints
imposed by the forward-looking assumption, it permits to solve analytically for the
path of the interest rate contingent to shocks and provides intuition on the mecha-
nisms explaining the diﬀerent reactions of a central bank in heterogeneous and baseline
economies.
The second sub-section, on the other hand, derives the monetary policy that is fully
optimal. This policy is not in the class of forward-looking policies since it features.
18This is the (logarithmic) relative price in the ﬂexible sector that would prevail were the whole
economy to feature ﬂexible prices. This variable is diﬀerent from zero only if, as in this case, the two
sectors can be aﬀected by diﬀerent shocks.
12However, results from the forward-looking case can be used in order to interpret the
dynamics of baseline and heterogeneous economies under such a policy.
4.1 The optimal non-inertial plan
In this sub-section, it is assumed that the central bank implements a purely forward-
looking policy: it sets its policy rate at each date depending only on the set of develop-
ments for the target variables that are possible from that period onwards. In particular,
it follows a simple rule of the form19
it = iss + ϕπ(πst − πss) (4.44)
Among the forward-looking plans, the central bank is assumed to follow the optimal
non-inertial plan20, that is the forward-looking policy minimizing the unconditional
expectation of the loss function L over the stationary distribution of the possible initial
exogenous states rn
0. This implies that the optimal plan does not depend on the state
of the economy at the time when the commitment is made, so that the central bank
policy is time consistent as in Woodford (1999, 2003). Moreover, ϕπ is assumed to
imply determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium. As a consequence of the
determinacy and the AR(1) assumption for the shocks, the path followed by the interest
rate, output gap and core inﬂation under the optimal non-inertial plan is
it = iss + firn
t , gt = gss + fgrn
t , πst = πss + fπrn
t (4.45)
where iss, gss and πss are the steady state values for the nominal interest rate, the out-
put gap and core inﬂation under the optimal policy deﬁned in (4.45). Replacing (4.45)
in (3.39), (3.34) and (2.30) and taking the unconditional expectation, the optimization
















(1 + fπρ − fi)
and
πss(1 − β)=kgss
19As for the speciﬁc form of the rule, notice that a slightly more complicated rule that also includes
the output gap would not improve on this simple one. In fact, since the relevant stochastic term for
the problem of the central bank is only the exogenous natural interest rate r
n
t or the composite shock
ut, a single variable rule is able to implement the non-inertial plan.
20See Woodford (2003) for an application.
13iss = πss
This optimization problem may be split into two independent parts. On the one hand,
the steady state component (choosing iss,gss,πss) and, on the other hand, the choice
of fi,f g and fπ for stabilization purposes. The focus of this paper is exclusively on
the impulse response function of the interest rate to shocks, so we only deal with the
solutions for fi,f g and fπ





+ φ(1 − βρ) = 0 (4.47)





where μ and φ are the lagrangian multipliers associated with the structural constraints.
Together with the constraints, the ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne a system of ﬁve linear
equations whose solution22 is
fi =
λg(1 − βρ)2 + k2
λg(1 − βρ)2 + k2 + λi [S(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ]
2 (4.50)
fπ =
kλi(S(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ)
λg(1 − βρ)2 + k2 + λi [S(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ]
2
fg =
λi(1 − βρ)[S(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ]
λg(1 − βρ)2 + k2 + λi [S(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ]
2





λg(1 − βρ)2 + k2
kλi(S(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ)
(4.51)
The analysis is restricted to positive values of ϕπ and ϕπ has to be bigger than one to
ensure determinacy. This implies
0 <S (1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − kρ <
λg(1 − βρ)2 + k2
kλi
(4.52)
21The interested reader is referred to Woodford (1999, 2003) for the steady state solution in this
context.
22From the solution for πst,gt and it, one can derive the solution for all the other variables in the
economy.
14λg(1−βρ)2+k2
kλi is positive, implying that the set of parameters identiﬁed in (4.52) is non-
empty.
The impulse response function of the interest rate to a natural rate shock is char-
acterized by the coeﬃcient fi, as in Giannoni (2002). It must also be noted that fi is
always positive and can take values between 0 and 1. In the policy problem deﬁned in
Aoki (2001), fi is equal to 1, due to the lack of stabilization trade-oﬀs for the central
bank. Hence, fi is independent of the size of the ﬂexible price sector in that economy.
However, when the central bank faces a trade-oﬀ between macroeconomic stabilization
and operating target stabilization it may not be optimal to set fi to 1. Operating
target stabilization would require fi to be as small as possible, closer to 0 than 1 and
the central bank eventually sets fi at the intermediate level reﬂecting the right balance
among conﬂicting objectives. Interestingly, the optimal fi when there is a trade-oﬀ
does depend on γ, the size of the sticky price sector.
Studying the way in which fi depends on the size of the sticky price sector sheds light
on the question if, under certain circumstances, the optimal non-inertial plan in the
heterogeneous economy leads to a less aggressive (a smaller fi) reaction of the interest
rate than in the baseline New Keynesian economy. The diﬀerence in the aggressiveness
of the central bank in the two economies can be analyzed by comparing the fi in (4.50)
with f∗
i , the counterpart to fi in the baseline case γ = 1. Notice that the value of γ
aﬀects both the structural equations and the weights of the three economic variables
in the loss function. In fact, besides (3.40), the following relationships hold between














The higher weights to interest and output gap stabilization with respect to inﬂation
in the heterogeneous economy arise because in this type of economy, the sticky price
distortion aﬀects a smaller fraction of the ﬁrms than in the baseline economy. Moreover,
sticky price inﬂation is more sensitive to the level of the output gap in the model with
heterogeneity than in the one without (k>k ∗) and then the output gap weight is
further magniﬁed in the model with heterogeneity even relative to the interest rate
stabilization objective.
Setting γ = 1, we can derive the optimal reaction of the interest rate to a shock in




g(1 − βρ)2 + k∗2
λ∗
g(1 − βρ)2 + k∗2 + λ∗
i [σ(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − k∗ρ]
2 (4.56)
23Coeﬃcients of the baseline model are denoted by a star.
15In order to facilitate the comparison between fi and f∗
i , we can use equations from
(4.53) to (4.55) and (3.40) to rearrange terms in fi such that
fi =
λ∗
g(1 − βρ)2 + k∗2
λ∗
g(1 − βρ)2 + k∗2 +
λ∗
i







{[γσ +( 1− γ)c](1− ρ)(1 − βρ) − k∗ρ}
2 > [σ(1 − ρ)(1 − βρ) − k∗ρ]
2
(4.58)
The inequality in (4.58) holds if σ is smaller than or equal to 124. In fact, in that
case σ is smaller than or equal to c and the left hand side of the equality in (4.58) is
bigger than or equal to the right hand side. However, when σ is big enough, fi can
be either bigger than, smaller than or equal to f∗
i depending on other features of the
economy.
The result can be interpreted by looking at equation (3.39) and (3.40), which allow
us to recast the monetary policy problem in the model with heterogeneity in a format
that only includes the policy relevant variables (which are those that explicitly appear
in the loss function of the central bank) and is directly comparable to the traditional
problem in the baseline New Keynesian model. These equations imply that the central
bank in the model with nominal heterogeneity behaves like a central bank in a model
with a representative sector but with output less interest-sensitive than in the baseline
case (S>σ ). Then, in the heterogeneous model, the monetary policy-maker has less
incentive to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization than in the baseline
case since she acts as though monetary policy were less eﬀective at dampening the
ﬂuctuations in aggregate activity and consequently in inﬂation. This explains why she
rather engages in more interest rate stabilization and then the smaller reaction of the
interest rate to economic shocks. However, when σ is big, the result is not so clear
cut and, depending on the values taken by other structural parameters, both more or
less aggressive behavior can stem from the optimal plan in the heterogeneous economy












may help to understand why. S is always bigger than σ implying that the policymaker in
the core model always behaves as if output were less sensitive than in the baseline case,
but this ratio decreases with the increase in σ, stabilizing around 1 +
1−γ
γ(1+ω). Hence,
the diﬀerence in the strength of the eﬀects of monetary policy on output tends to
decrease when σ increases, making output less interest-sensitive. Moreover, an increase
24Notice that the positivity constraint on ϕπ implies that [γσ +( 1− γ)c](1− ρ)(1 − βρ) − k
∗ρ
2 is
positive. The inequality also holds for some values of σ bigger than 1 since the result can be extended
to those values by continuity. However, deriving the exact upper bound for σ is cumbersome and does
not add much content to the main message of the paper.
16in σ increases k more than k∗ as shown by (4.53) and (2.31). Sticky price inﬂation
is still more sensitive to aggregate activity in the core model than in the baseline
model, but this diﬀerence is magniﬁed by the increase in σ. These two factors imply
that macroeconomic stabilization becomes more attractive relative to operating target
stabilization for the central bank in the core model when σ increases. Eventually,
macroeconomic stabilization may become more important in the heterogeneous model
than in the baseline model relative to operating target stabilization, explaining why
monetary policy might turn out to be more aggressive in the former than in the latter
economy.
4.2 The unconstrained optimal interest rule
Although it allows useful insights, in general the optimal non-inertial plan represents a
sub-optimal choice and also one that is not fully supported by the empirical analysis on
the behavior of central banks. Indeed, with forward-looking private agents the central
bank can improve on the non-inertial plan by committing to some form of inertial
behavior that could shape expectations towards a stronger stabilization of the welfare
relevant variables. Moreover, lagged interest rate terms are shown to be empirically
relevant for the analysis of the behavior of central banks.












πst = βEtπst+1 + kgt
gt = Et(gt+1) −
1
S
(it − Etπst+1 − ut)
Setting up the Lagrangian of this problem, taking the ﬁrst order conditions and
replacing the Lagrange multipliers, it can be shown that the solution of this problem

















Demanding that this policy is already in place at time 0 and 1 allows the cen-
tral bank to achieve time consistency (that is, it implements the policy that is optimal
from a timeless perspective). The optimal rule has some notable features already inves-
tigated by Giannoni and Woodford (2002b) for the baseline New Keynesian economy26:
25See Giannoni and Woodford (2002a)
26Notice that the optimal rule in the baseline New Keynesian model can be retrieved once again by
setting γ =1
17- it is history-dependent in that the optimal interest rates depends on its own two
lags and on the ﬁrst lag of the output gap;
- it resembles a Taylor rule in that the optimal interest rate is a linear function of
inﬂation and the output gap.
Next, in order to derive the dynamics of this economy and, in particular, of the
interest rate in response to shocks, the following system of three stochastic diﬀerence
equations has to be solved:
πst = βEtπst+1 + kgt (4.60)
gt = Et(gt+1) −
1
S

















It can be proved27 that, under this policy, the economy can follow only one contin-
gent path (in other words, the solution is determinate) for any value of the parameters.
However, the solution for this system is to be derived numerically28 due to the presence
of three more state variables (the lags of the interest rate and output gap) than in the
optimal non-inertial plan.
As in the previous section, the focus here is on the reaction of the nominal interest
rate to a unitary shock in rn
t , comparing the outcomes in the heterogeneous to those
in the baseline New Keynesian economy. In order to solve the model, numerical values
have to be assigned to the parameters in equations (4.60) to (4.62). The baseline
calibration takes the values of the parameters estimated in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), with some exceptions. In particular, ξ is set to 0.75, a value that is plausible
empirically and that implies that ﬁrms reset their price on average once a year (with
quarterly data). More importantly, the model in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), does
not feature sectoral heterogeneity in the price adjustment mechanisms. Hence, in order
to calibrate the parameter γ (the percentage of ﬁrms with a sticky price adjustment),
we follow Bils and Klenow (2004) and set it to 0.75. These and the other values of the
structural parameters in this economy are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Model β σ γ ω ξ ϑ ρ ν η k S λi λg
Heterogeneous economy 0.99 0.16 0.75 0.5 0.75 7 0.6 1 1 0.018 0.35 0.004 0.004
Baseline economy 0.99 0.16 1 0.5 0.75 7 0.6 1 1 0.013 0.16 0.003 0.002
27For a proof in the case of the baseline New Keynesian model, see Giannoni and Woodford (2002b).
The case of the heterogeneous economy does not require a separate proof due to the isomorphism of
the two minimization problems
28The numerical solutions are derived by using the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore.
18Notice that the values of the ﬁrst nine parameters (from β to η) are assumed, while
the remaining four parameters are non-linear functions of the previous nine. The only
diﬀerence in the values of the ﬁrst nine parameters between the heterogeneous and
baseline New Keynesian economies lies in the percentage of sticky price ﬁrms (γ)w h i c h
is 100% in the baseline economy. Given these values of the parameters, ﬁgure 1 plots
the reaction of the nominal interest rate in the heterogeneous (solid line) and baseline
(dashed line) economies.
Figure 1: Reaction of nominal interest to a unitary shock in the natural real interest
rate














Figure 1 shows that, given the values of the parameters assumed in the baseline
calibration, the reaction of the interest rate in the heterogeneous economy is less ag-
gressive than in the baseline economy. In other words, the concern for interest rate
stabilization is more relevant in the heterogeneous economy than in the fully sticky
economy.
However, in the previous section, we saw that higher values of σ imply that this
19result can be reversed, with the reaction of the interest rate being less aggressive in
the baseline than in the heterogeneous economy. Hence, ﬁgure 2 reports results on the
reaction of the nominal interest rate in the heterogeneous and baseline New Keynesian






which is the ratio of the reaction of the interest rate in the heterogenous economy
relative to the corresponding reaction in the baseline New Keynesian economy at the
time when the shock is realized (t=1). A value smaller than 1 in this ratio indicates
that, on impact, monetary policy is less aggressive in the heterogeneous than in the
baseline economy.
Figure 2: Ratio impact response interest rate in heterogeneous versus baseline NK
model









Figure 2 shows that the reaction of the interest rate in the model with heterogeneity
is always less aggressive than in the case where all prices are sticky. This also happens
for very high values of σ, although the ratio is monotonically increasing for values of σ
higher than one. This result partly mirrors those obtained with the non-inertial plan:
for high values of sigma, the relative importance of macroeconomic stabilization with
respect to interest rate stabilization increases more in the model with heterogeneous
price setters than in the baseline New Keynesian model. However, the numerical sim-
ulations show that, conditional to the values assigned to the other parameters of the
20models in the calibration, the result of a less aggressive reaction of the interest rate in
the heterogeneous economy remains robust for higher values of σ.
Appendix 2 reports results for the ratio when several other parameters of the model
are assumed to vary from the values assigned in the baseline calibration. The outcome
of these simulations is that the reaction of the nominal interest rate in the heterogeneous
economy remains robustly less aggressive than in the baseline New Keynesian economy.
In conclusion, the result of the attenuation in the reaction of the interest rate to
shocks in the model with heterogeneous price setters is quite robust. This supports
the idea that the puzzling caution in the conduct of monetary policy by actual central
banks may be partly explained by the fact that they take into account the sectorial
heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the optimal monetary policy problem of a central bank facing sec-
torial heterogeneity in price setting. The focus is on the reaction of the interest rate to
structural shocks. Comparing this reaction in an economy with heterogeneity with one
in which all goods have sticky prices, it is found that a central bank is much more likely
to react less aggressively to shocks in the heterogeneous economy. Since actual central
banks take into account the sectorial heterogeneity in price setting mechanisms in that
they derive and monitor core inﬂation indices excluding the most volatile components
of consumer prices, this ﬁnding might help to explain why their reaction to shocks is
considered too cautious.
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22Appendix 1: Derivation of the welfare criterion
This appendix expounds the steps taken to derive the loss function of the central bank
by means of a second order approximation to social welfare, deﬁned by aggregating the
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(A.63)
For simplicity, deﬁne for the general variable At,

at = At − A
where A is the steady state of At,a n d




Then, the following useful relationship holds




















Bt + t.i.p. + O(3)
where t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy. Exploiting (4.61) and noticing that
bt = − UCB
UCCCBt and σ = −UCCC










+ t.i.p. + O(3) (A.65)
Approximation of K(Mt
Pt ,D t)
Assume, ss in Woodford (2003), that the transaction technology implies that there is
satiation in real money balances at a ﬁnite positive level. Moreover, all the conditions
on the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption and real
balances invoked in Woodford (2003), pg 422 are veriﬁed. Besides that, assume that
Δ= I
1+I is small and can be treated as an expansion parameter. This leads to the
conclusion that the economy is well approximated in a neighborhood of the steady state
























































+ t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.67)
where σm = −KMMM
KM . Deﬁning Sm = MKM
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+ t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.68)
















t + Smσmεtmt + O(3) = Smmt −
1
2
Smσm (mt − εt)
2 + t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.69)
If (steady state) money velocity is deﬁned as v = Y













that can be used together with ηi = UC
KM
1
(1+I)σm to show that
ηiv =( Smσm)
−1 + O(Δ)
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1
2
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+ t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.70)
24Finally,
mt = ηyyt − ηiit + εt
where ηy= σ

















+ t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.71)
















f,t + t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.72)







A2 = VHjHj (A.74)
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Before working out the approximation of this term, notice that





Va r i (ys,t(i)) (A.79)
where Ei and Va r i are, respectively, the mean and the variance of ys,t(i) with respect













i − VHHEi (ys,t(i))As,t + VHHηEi (ys,t(i))es,t + t.i.p. + O(3)
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+ t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.80)
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+ t.i.p. + O(3)
(A.81)
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f,t − (1 + ω)yf,taf,t + ηyf,tef,t
 
(A.82)










one can show that
Va r i (ys,t(i)) = ϑ2Va r i (ps,t(i))
The term on the right hand side represents the dispersion of prices in the sticky price
sector due to the staggered price setting mechanism described by Calvo. Intuitively,
this term depends on inﬂation in the sticky price sector, since if inﬂation in the sticky
price sector is zero at each time, no dispersion would be observed among relative prices
set by sticky price setters. Deﬁne
ps,t = Ei lnps,t(i)
and notice that



















The term we are interested in is



















































which, in turn, implies that
27ps,t = ps,t + O(2) (A.88)
Hence,





which, by backward iteration, gives
















s,t + t.i.p. + O(3) (A.89)
Final Form of the loss function
Notice that, from the ﬁrst order conditions
VH = UC ⇒ VHH = UCY
Moreover,
yt = γys,t +( 1− γ)yf,t
yn
t = γyn
s,t +( 1− γ)yn
f,t
and
gt = yt − yn
t














The term 2Smηiit +( vηi)−1i2










t = ηiv−1(it +Δ ) 2 + t.i.p. =( vηi)−1(it − i∗)2
where i∗=-Δ. Moreover, further tedious algebraic manipulations show that
28[ys,t − yf,t − c(ys,t − yf,t)]
2 =






















(ω + σ)(1 − ξ)(1 − ξβ)
ξγ2ϑ(1 + ωϑ)
(A.92)
disregarding scaling parameters, terms independent of policy and O(3) terms.
29Appendix 2: Robustness checks
This appendix shows how the ratio of the impact reaction in the interest rates in the
heterogenous economy relative to the baseline New Keynesian economy varies when the
values of the parameters depart from those in the baseline calibration.
Figure 3: Ratio impact response interest rate in heterogeneous versus baseline NK
model











Obviously, when the percentage of ﬁrms with sticky price tends to 100%, the out-
comes in the heterogeneous and baseline New Keynesian economy tend to become the
same.
30Figure 4: Ratio impact response interest rate in heterogeneous versus baseline NK
model












High values of ω reduce the diﬀerences in the reaction of the interest rate to shocks
in the heterogeneous economy compared to the baseline. However, the result does not
disappear even for extremely high values of this parameter. The interpretation for
the convergence of the results in the heterogeneous economy to those for the baseline
economy is that, while the sensitivity of inﬂation to the output gap does not vary
much with ω, the sensitivity of aggregate activity to the interest rate decreases a lot in
the heterogeneous economy (conditional to the value assigned to σ)w h e nω increases.
Then, the central bank engages more and more in macroeconomic stabilization relative
to the baseline economy.
31Figure 5: Ratio impact response interest rate in heterogeneous versus baseline NK
model










The outcome of this simulation shows that the result of attenuation in the mon-
etary policy reaction in a heterogeneous economy does not depend on the degree of
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